Demand side

Proven rule. Every body claim traces to a named, dated source. Where a number could not be traced to a primary source, it is marked as such and parked in §4, not smoothed over.

Number-type key used throughout: (a) audited/government statistic · (b) company or government-programme press-release claim · (c) third-party aggregator/estimate (ECDB, Statista, Euromonitor, Mordor, IMARC and similar) · (f) explicit forecast, labelled with publisher and horizon.

Source legend

• [A5-S1] The National, "Amazon UAE site to showcase 100,000 companies, including local SMEs, by 2026" (2023-03-14) — https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/technology/2023/03/14/amazon-uae-site-to-showcase-100000-companies-including-local-smes-by-2026/ (accessed 2026-09-05, via search synthesis; direct fetch not attempted)
• [A5-S2] Eye of Dubai / Zawya, "Monsha'at inks MoU with Amazon to host 40,000 SMEs on its Saudi Arabia store by 2025" (dated to the March 2022 Global Entrepreneurship Conference, Riyadh) — https://www.eyeofdubai.ae/news/details/1648637009- (accessed 2026-09-05, via search synthesis)
• [A5-S3] Dubai Media Office (issued jointly by Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism and Dubai Chambers), "Dubai Traders Accelerates Business Growth in Breakthrough First Year with Over 2,400 New E-Commerce Sellers" (2025-11-04) — https://mediaoffice.ae/en/news/2025/november/04-11/dubai-traders-accelerates-business-growth (accessed 2026-09-05, fetched directly in full)
• [A5-S4] SAMA (Saudi Central Bank), "E-Payments Account for 85% of Total Retail Payments in 2025" (published 2026-04-12) — https://www.sama.gov.sa/en-us/mediacenter/news/pages/news-1139.aspx (accessed 2026-09-05, fetched directly)
• [A5-S5] SPA / Saudi Gazette reporting of SAMA Mada-card e-commerce sales data: Q1 2025 SAR 69.3bn (+56% YoY, record high) — https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2351771 ; October 2025 SAR 30.7bn (+68% YoY, record high) — https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/657678 (accessed 2026-09-05 via search synthesis; both URLs returned HTTP 403/402 on direct fetch and could not be independently confirmed — treat as secondary reporting of a SAMA statistic, not a verified primary read)
• [A5-S6] GASTAT, "Operating Revenues Index for Wholesale and Retail Trade Increases by 3.2% in Q2 of 2026" (published 2026-08-30) — https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/w/news/212 (accessed 2026-09-05, fetched directly)
• [A5-S7] Arab News, "Saudi wholesale and retail trade revenues rise 7.3% in Q1: GASTAT" — https://www.arabnews.com/node/2645627/business-economy (accessed 2026-09-05 via search synthesis; direct fetch returned only page chrome, no article body — figures below are the search tool's extraction, not an independently confirmed read)
• [A5-S8] GASTAT, "Digital Economy accounts for 15.6% of Saudi Arabia's GDP" (published 2025-05-25, referring to 2023 data) — https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/w/news/46 (accessed 2026-09-05, fetched directly)
• [A5-S9] ECDB, "E-Commerce Industry in the UAE 2018-2030" — https://ecdb.com/resources/sample-data/market/ae/all — inherited as 006:[W27] (accessed 2026-08-19): UAE e-commerce ≈US$8.1bn 2025, Amazon #1, noon #2
• [A5-S10] ECDB, "Noon Company & Revenue 2015-2027" — https://ecdb.com/resources/sample-data/retailer/noon (accessed 2026-09-05 via search synthesis, not independently fetched): noon annual sales ≈US$1,874m 2025
• [A5-S11] swftbox blog, "UAE Ecommerce in 2026: Why the Reality Doesn't Match the LinkedIn Narrative" — https://www.swftbox.com/swftblogger/uae-ecommerce-reality-2026 (accessed 2026-09-05, fetched directly) — a secondary compilation that itself names its sources: Statista, Mordor Intelligence, "Dubai-government-backed EZDubai/Euromonitor," INTLBM, Bain & Company, ECDB
• [A5-S12] Monsha'at, node/274250 — https://www.monshaat.gov.sa/en/node/274250 (accessed 2026-09-05, fetched directly): Q4 2024 total commercial registrations 1.6 million, +67% quarter-on-quarter; regional split (Riyadh 39%, Makkah 17%, Eastern Region 16%, Qassim 6%, Aseer 5%, rest 17%). Does not break out e-commerce specifically — see reconciliation note
• [A5-S13] Search-synthesis claim (source page not independently confirmed): Monsha'at e-commerce-classified commercial registrations "40,953" in Q4 2024 (+10% YoY) and "39,366" in Q2 2025 (38% youth-owned, 47% women-owned) (accessed 2026-09-05) — flagged low-confidence, see §4
• [A5-S14] Kafalah (SME Loan Guarantee Program, Ministry of Finance) — https://www.kafalah.gov.sa/en/About/Pages/default.aspx ; eligibility tiers via https://www.saib.com.sa/en/kafalah-program ; SPA, "Kafalah Provides SAR13.9 Billion in Loan Guarantees to Support SMEs in 2024" — https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2254249 (accessed 2026-09-05 via search synthesis)
• [A5-S15] Mohammed Bin Rashid Fund for SME / Dubai SME — https://thefund.ae/funding-criteria ; https://www.dubaifoundershq.com/en/fund-your-business/the-fund (accessed 2026-09-05 via search synthesis)
• [A5-S16] SPC Free Zone, e-commerce licence pricing page — https://www.spcfz.ae/blogs/e-commerce-license-dubai-uae-costs/ (accessed 2026-09-05, fetched directly): "starting from just AED 5,750," visas/office space extra
• [A5-S17] Vendor pricing pages, not independently fetched (accessed 2026-09-05 via search synthesis): RAKEZ e-commerce licence "from AED 6,000"; Dubai CommerCity "from AED 9,000"
• [A5-S18] Nawaz Mentorship, "Amazon FBA Wholesale & Amazon Arbitrage In UAE & KSA" — https://nawazmentorship.com/product/amazon-fba-wholesale-amazon-arbitrage-in-uae-ksa/ (accessed 2026-09-05, fetched directly): $65 (list $100)
• [A5-S19] Coursetakers.ae course-fee listing for Dubai Amazon FBA courses — https://www.coursetakers.ae/search/courses-in/professional/business/ecommerce/amazon-fba/fees?city=Dubai (accessed 2026-09-05 via search synthesis, not independently fetched): AED 2,000–3,000 range
• [A5-S20] Vendor/agency blog synthesis on UAE Amazon-agency pricing (exact originating page not confirmed — search tool's synthesis pointed at a page that on direct fetch contained no pricing; treat as unverified, see §4) (accessed 2026-09-05): monthly retainer AED 2,000–10,000, or 10–20% of ad spend; separate "tool cost" line AED 800–3,000/month
• 006:[L18] — Chris Rawlings skill-building video (2026), cited in 006 finding 07: Claude consumer plan $17/mo
• 006:[L13] — practitioner summit recap, cited in 006 finding 07: Claude Code "~$200/month," framed as cheaper than a VA team
• 006:[L91] — vendor interview, cited in 006 finding 07: Superfuel ~$49/mo, usage-based, 4-week trial
• 006:[L96] — cited in 006 finding 07: ZonGuru ~$75/listing

1. What we found

1.1 Seller population — thin, target-heavy, no clean current count for any of the three platforms

No source — Amazon's, noon's, or a regulator's — publishes an audited, dated count of active third-party sellers currently transacting on amazon.ae, amazon.sa, or noon.com. What exists is a mix of forward-looking pledges (b) and one hard, scoped, government-issued flow number (b, but close to a):

Two things to hold onto: (1) the "100,000" and "40,000" figures are targets that platforms and governments announced jointly, not counts of sellers who actually signed up and are actively selling — whether either was hit is not established (see §4). (2) The Dubai Traders number is the single most trustworthy figure in this section because it is scoped, dated, government-issued, and describes an actual flow (new sellers onboarded in a defined 12-month window) rather than an aspiration — but it covers one emirate, one government programme, not all of amazon.ae/noon.com sellers UAE-wide, let alone KSA.

Nothing in any source disaggregates "third-party seller" into the importer-reseller archetype this Inquiry cares about — all three platform-level numbers plainly include brands, distributors, service sellers, and (for Amazon) potentially first-party vendors alongside importer-resellers.

1.2 Market size — measured index growth is solid; absolute GMV is all aggregator estimate, and estimates disagree by 3x

What is genuinely measured (a): - KSA — GASTAT's official E-Commerce Sales Index (part of the Wholesale & Retail Trade Statistics publication) rose +9.8% YoY in Q2 2026 (retail +13.4%, wholesale +6.5%, motor vehicles +2.4%; QoQ retail +1.1%, wholesale +0.3%, motor vehicles +0.1%), published 2026-08-30 [A5-S6]. The Q1 2026 release is reported (via Arab News, not independently re-confirmed) at +13.6% YoY for the same index (retail +18.4%, wholesale +10.0%, motor vehicles +3.2%) [A5-S7]. Both are index growth rates, not absolute GMV — GASTAT does not publish a riyal figure for total e-commerce sales in these releases. - KSA — SAMA: e-payments were 85% of total retail payment transactions in 2025, up from 79% in 2024; electronic transaction volume 14.6bn (2025) vs 12.6bn (2024) [A5-S4]. This is economy-wide digital payments, not online-marketplace GMV specifically. - KSA — Mada-card e-commerce sales reportedly hit a record SAR 69.3bn in Q1 2025 (+56% YoY) and SAR 30.7bn in October 2025 (+68% YoY) [A5-S5] — but this line could not be independently re-verified (source pages blocked on direct fetch) and, even if accurate, Mada is the domestic debit-card network only: it excludes credit-card and cross-border-card e-commerce, so it understates total e-commerce value while being a genuinely measured slice of it. - KSA — Digital economy = 15.6% of GDP in 2023 (+1.6 points vs 2022), published 2025-05-25 [A5-S8]. Macro context, not e-commerce-specific.

What is aggregator estimate (c), and disagrees sharply: - UAE e-commerce GMV 2024/2025: US$7.5bn (Statista, per [A5-S11]'s citation) vs US$8.1bn (ECDB [A5-S9]) vs US$8.8bn / AED 32.3bn (Euromonitor via EZDubai, per [A5-S11]) vs US$12.3bn (Mordor Intelligence, per [A5-S11]) — roughly a 1.6x spread across four named aggregators covering the same year, before even reaching the most extreme outliers found elsewhere (single-source claims as low as ~$11bn and as high as several hundred billion turned up in generic market-report SEO pages with no stated methodology and are not used here). - KSA e-commerce GMV 2025: reported ranges from ~US$16–20bn (pure B2C online retail) to ~US$27–31bn (broader "digital commerce" including travel, food delivery, B2B) depending on scope — a roughly 1.6–2x spread driven entirely by definition, not new data. - UAE platform share: Amazon.ae ≈40% of UAE online retail GMV (Euromonitor, cited via [A5-S11]); Amazon.ae + noon + Carrefour together ≈45–50% of UAE GMV in 2025–26 (INTLBM/Mordor, cited via [A5-S11]) — noon's standalone share is not separately stated in any source found. - noon annual sales ≈US$1,874m in 2025 (ECDB [A5-S10]) — an aggregator estimate of one private company's GMV, not noon's own disclosure (noon does not publish financials). - E-commerce penetration of total retail: UAE/GCC reported at "15–20% of retail in 2025, essentially flat into 2026" (ECDB, cited via [A5-S11]) vs mature markets (China ~47%, UK/South Korea ~30%) — directional, useful as context, still an aggregator estimate.

What is forecast (f): EZDubai/Euromonitor's AED 50.6bn (~US$13.8bn) UAE e-commerce GMV figure is explicitly a 2029 forecast, not a current measurement [A5-S11].

Bottom line for this section: treat "UAE e-commerce is roughly a high-single-digit-billion- dollar market growing double digits, with Amazon the largest single online retailer" as the most defensible summary sentence — anything more precise than that is aggregator-dependent and should be quoted with its named source, never as a flat fact.

1.3 The importer-seller profile — thin, exactly as the Brief expects

This is the one section where the data genuinely runs out. The only concrete, sourced profile data found describes one government programme's cohort in one emirate, not the importer-seller population at large:

• Dubai Traders (Amazon-onboarded sellers specifically): 23% Emirati-owned, 35% women-owned; 15% of all programme participants (370+ businesses) Emirati-owned overall; over a third of sellers listing 5+ products reached "top sales volumes" in their category; 15% of sellers expanded internationally, 40% preparing to [A5-S3].
• Dubai Traders (noon-partnered sellers specifically): 42% expanded into new product categories, 63% added new SKUs, 1-in-3 multiplied monthly GMV within one month of onboarding [A5-S3].
• Saudi e-commerce-classified commercial registrations (all channels, not Amazon/noon-specific, and low-confidence — see §4): reportedly 38% youth-owned, 47% women-owned as of Q2 2025 [A5-S13].

What is missing, and not filled with inference: - Expat vs. national ownership split among actual amazon.ae/amazon.sa/noon.com sellers — no source found. The Dubai Traders "23%/15% Emirati-owned" figures are the closest proxy that exists, and they describe a government-run onboarding cohort self-selected toward nationals (a stated programme goal), not the organic seller base. - SME vs. solo/individual operator split — no source found. - Category mix specific to importer-resellers (as opposed to sellers generally) — no source found. Category-level e-commerce growth data exists (e.g., 006's finding that Amazon Ads material names personal care and home appliances as UAE growth categories, 006:[W9]) but that describes consumer demand, not seller composition. - Typical revenue of an importer-reseller on these platforms — no source found.

Per the Brief's own instruction, this gap is reported as a gap. Any importer-seller profile used downstream in the Consolidated Brief should be sourced to Ilia's own SHIO experience and to A4's community/course material, not to this Area.

1.4 Willingness to pay — real numbers exist for global tooling and UAE agencies/courses; GCC-specific 3PL pricing was not found

Software subscriptions (inherited from 006, all global/US-centric list prices — no GCC-specific discount or localized pricing found for any of these):

006 explicitly flagged that "nobody totals a small seller's AI-stack cost" — that gap is still open; this Area did not close it either.

Courses (UAE-specific, vendor list prices, not verified enrollment/revenue data): - Nawaz Mentorship's "Amazon FBA Wholesale & Amazon Arbitrage In UAE & KSA" course: $65 (list $100) [A5-S18]. - Coursetakers.ae aggregates Dubai Amazon-FBA short courses in the AED 2,000–3,000 range [A5-S19]. - These two data points disagree by roughly 10x (a $65 self-paced product vs. AED 2,000+ in-person/cohort training) — both are real listed prices, just for different product types, and the gap itself is informative: there is no single "market price" for seller education here.

Agencies (UAE-specific, unverified — see §4): a vendor-blog synthesis (source page not independently confirmed) put UAE Amazon-agency pricing at a monthly retainer of AED 2,000–10,000, or alternatively 10–20% of ad spend, plus a separate "tool cost" line of AED 800–3,000/month [A5-S20]. Treat this as directional marketing-copy pricing, not audited.

3PL: No GCC-specific pricing was found. Generic (US) 3PL benchmarks turned up (~$2–3/order pick-and-pack, $18–25/pallet/month storage, $5–15/pallet receiving, $250–1,000 setup fee) and Dubai warehousing is confirmed to be quoted by three conventions (per pallet/month, per CBM/month, per sq ft/year) — but no actual AED figure for any of them. This is a real, parked gap, not an inferred number.

Free-zone e-commerce licences (a cost sellers already pay, not a subsidy — see §5): SPC Free Zone confirmed directly at AED 5,750 starting [A5-S16]; RAKEZ "from AED 6,000" and Dubai CommerCity "from AED 9,000" per unverified vendor pages [A5-S17].

1.5 Government programmes — they fund sellers and SME finance broadly, not software companies

The clean answer to the Brief's question: every programme found here funds or supports the seller (training, onboarding, ad credits, loan guarantees) — none of them is a grant, subsidy, or preferential channel for a software company building tools for those sellers. A software startup's funding path in this region runs through equity accelerators and VCs, which is A8's territory, not a government seller-enablement programme. Escalation criterion "government money directly available for this kind of product" is therefore NOT triggered — worth stating plainly rather than leaving ambiguous.

One second-order point worth flagging to the Orchestrator: Dubai Traders already gives sellers free onboarding, ad credits and priority placement through Amazon/noon directly — any AI-operator product competing on "get you onboarded and visible" in Dubai specifically is competing against a government programme that gives a version of that away for free to a subset of sellers.

1.6 Bottom-up TAM/SAM sketch

Every number below is either sourced (cited) or a labelled Scout assumption. No step in this section derives from GMV. All figures are annual unless stated otherwise.

Step 1 — the ceiling: stock-based TAM using platform targets, not current actuals

140,000 × mid-case ACV of $600/yr (see Step 3) = ≈$84M/yr ceiling TAM. Caveats stacked on this number: it is a target, not a current count; it includes brands and non-importer sellers; it excludes noon entirely; and it is not filtered for "importer" at all. Treat this as an outer bound only, not a market-sizing claim to quote at a partner without the caveats attached.

Step 2 — the beachhead-consistent flow: new importer-seller entrants per year

The only directly-measured flow number (new sellers signing up in a given period, matching the "0 → first sale" beachhead) is Dubai Traders: 2,400 new e-commerce sellers/year, Amazon + noon combined, Dubai only [A5-S3].

To extend this to UAE+KSA requires assumptions the Scout is labelling explicitly, not treating as sourced:

This band should be read as "a plausible order of magnitude constructed transparently from one real data point," not as a market-research estimate. It has not been validated by any independent source, and the Scout was unable to find one — this is the honest state of the evidence.

Step 3 — ACV assumptions

Step 4 — SAM/beachhead sketch and realistic capture

24,000–28,800 new entrants/yr × $600/yr mid-ACV = ≈$14.4M–17.3M/yr if every single new entrant became a paying customer in their first year — which they will not. Applying an illustrative, explicitly unsourced capture-rate band of 1–5% of new entrants (typical for an early product competing against free platform onboarding, free community/course content, and the government programmes in §1.5) gives a year-1-cohort SOM of roughly $144k–865k/yr, growing as cohorts stack in later years if retention holds — churn/retention is out of scope for this Area (SCOPE.md assigns "design for graduation" to the Consolidated Brief).

What this sketch is for: it shows the arithmetic is not obviously broken — the population is not "an order of magnitude smaller than a viable SaaS market" on the numbers found, so the Area Brief's first escalation criterion is not triggered. But every input above Step 1's raw two target-numbers is either an aggregator estimate, a single-emirate government program, or a labelled guess. This sketch should travel with its assumptions attached, not as a standalone headline number.

2. Numbers at a glance, classified

3. Reconciliation notes

Reconciliation note. [A5-S9] (ECDB, ~$8.1bn) and [A5-S11]'s cited Euromonitor/EZDubai figure (~$8.8bn) for UAE e-commerce GMV are close enough to treat as convergent aggregator consensus for 2024/25. [A5-S11]'s own cited Statista figure ($7.5bn) and Mordor Intelligence figure ($12.3bn) bracket that consensus on either side. Resolved by presenting the full range with all four names attached (§1.2), not by picking a winner — the Brief's hard rule against letting an aggregator estimate pass as a single fact applies here directly.

Reconciliation note. [A5-S12] (Monsha'at's own Q4 2024 release, fetched directly) reports total commercial registrations of 1.6 million (+67% QoQ) with no e-commerce-specific figure. [A5-S13]'s claimed "40,953 e-commerce registrations, +10% YoY" for the same quarter came from a search-tool synthesis whose exact source page could not be pinned down and was not independently confirmed. These are not necessarily contradictory (one is "all registrations," the other claims to be "e-commerce registrations" specifically) but the second figure's provenance is weak enough that it is flagged low-confidence in §2 and should not be quoted without further verification.

Reconciliation note. One search synthesis reported "Amazon UAE 2024 revenue: US$739.7m" and a separate synthesis reported "Amazon UAE online revenue US$847,350m in 2025" (almost certainly a units error for $847.35m in the original). Neither could be traced to a primary Amazon disclosure — Amazon does not break out UAE-specific revenue in its own filings — and the two numbers are not on a consistent basis (one may be 1P net sales, the other something closer to GMV). Both are dropped from this Finding's headline numbers rather than presented as fact; they are noted here only so a future Scout does not re-discover and re-cite them uncritically.

4. Open Questions / Parked

• Were the Amazon.ae "100,000 by 2026" and Amazon.sa "40,000 by 2025" targets actually hit? No update, retrospective, or "we reached our goal" press release was found for either. Given 2025 has passed and 2026 is the current year, this is answerable and worth a targeted follow-up search specifically for post-target-date reporting.
• Exact eligibility criteria for the Monsha'at–Amazon MoU (nationality, revenue thresholds, legal structure) — not found; only the headline "40,000 SMEs" figure surfaced.
• [A5-S13]'s Monsha'at e-commerce registration figures (40,953 / 39,366) — exact source page. Flagged low-confidence throughout; needs a direct fetch of the specific Monsha'at SME Monitor quarterly report (not the node/274250 release, which covers all registrations) before being quoted anywhere investor-facing.
• Direct primary URL for GASTAT's Q1 2026 E-Commerce Sales Index release — not located; the +13.6% figure rests on Arab News's reporting, itself not independently re-confirmed by direct fetch. The Q2 2026 figure [A5-S6] is solid (fetched directly from stats.gov.sa); a Scout with search budget remaining should locate the Q1 release for symmetry.
• SAMA Mada e-commerce sales figures ([A5-S5]) — both source URLs returned HTTP errors on direct fetch (403 for spa.gov.sa, 402 for saudigazette.com.sa). The 85%/79% e-payments figure [A5-S4] was independently confirmed via direct fetch of sama.gov.sa itself; the Mada-specific figures were not.
• Official Vision 2030 e-commerce/digital-payments targets — a claim that Vision 2030 targets ">70% of retail transactions digital" and ">80% non-cash" by 2030 surfaced via a third-party tracker site (vision2030.ai), not the official vision2030.gov.sa program pages (which returned HTTP 403 on direct fetch attempts). Not used in this Finding's body for that reason — park until verified against an official Vision 2030 program document (most likely the Financial Sector Development Program).
• Expat vs. national ownership among actual amazon.ae/amazon.sa/noon.com sellers. Not found anywhere. The closest proxies (Dubai Traders' 23%/15% Emirati-owned, Monsha'at's youth/women registration shares) describe different, narrower populations. This is the single biggest gap in this Area relative to what the Brief asked for, and it is being reported as a gap rather than filled with inference, per instruction.
• SME vs. individual-operator split, typical revenue, and category mix specific to importer- resellers (as distinct from sellers generally). Not found.
• GCC-specific 3PL pricing (AED/SAR per pallet, per order, setup fee). Not found; only generic US benchmarks and Dubai fee-structuring conventions (per pallet/CBM/sq ft) turned up.
• [A5-S20]'s exact source page for UAE agency pricing — the page the search tool appeared to attribute this to (innovexenterprises.com) was fetched directly and contained no pricing information at all, meaning the actual source of the AED 2,000–10,000 figure is uncertain. Use with caution; do not present as agency-confirmed pricing without a fresh, verified source.
• A dedicated Amazon or noon "SMB Impact Report" for the Middle East specifically (the kind Amazon publishes for the US, e.g. its 2020 SMB Impact Report) — searched for, not found. If one exists it would likely be the single best source for §1.1 and §1.3 and is worth another pass.

5. What this does NOT cover

• Whether the specific "aspiring importer-seller" beachhead can be isolated in any of these numbers. It cannot, with the sources found — every population and profile figure in this Finding is either a platform-wide seller count/target or a single government-programme cohort, not an importer-specific slice.
• Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Turkey, or other GCC states beyond UAE and KSA — out of scope per SCOPE.md.
• Food and quick-commerce (Talabat, InstaShop, noon Minutes) — out of scope per SCOPE.md, except where a source (like Dubai Traders' noon Minutes figure) mentioned it in passing; not analyzed further here.
• Own-store platforms (Salla, Zid, Shopify) and their SME bases — out of scope per SCOPE.md.
• Accelerator- and VC-specific funding terms, deadlines, and cohorts — that is A8's territory; §1.5 here only establishes that seller-enablement programmes are not a substitute for it.
• Churn, retention, or "design for graduation" mechanics — explicitly assigned to the Consolidated Brief per SCOPE.md's Grill outcomes, not to this Area.
• SHIO's own account state or Ilia's own numbers — SCOPE.md reserves this for Ilia in Seller Central, not for a Scout.
• Independent verification of every aggregator figure's underlying methodology — where this Finding cites ECDB, Euromonitor, Statista, or Mordor Intelligence, it is reporting what a secondary source (search results, or the swftbox compilation [A5-S11]) says those aggregators found; none of the paywalled original reports were purchased or read in full.